



ARMY GROUND RISK MANAGEMENT INFORMATION

Countermeasure

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
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What's the real focus in implementing safety measures in every aspect of a Soldier's life, whether on or off duty, at home or in theater? Do we forget the real meaning of protecting the force? How positive are these measures in relation to real-world events? Do Soldiers even care? These questions should open your eyes and give you some insight as to why Soldiers think of safety as being a pain in their side.



CPT MARK LEGASPI
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The real focus of safety obviously is to protect the lives of each Soldier in our ranks. There’s no argument about that. However, does this concept always hold true? Is there ever a time when you apply a safety measure to protect not only your Soldiers, but also yourself from reprimand?

Safety must be paramount at all times

for the right reasons. Leaders can’t afford to simply “check the block” when it comes to safety. Instead, safety programs must reach out in such a way that Soldiers realize safety isn’t something that takes the “fun” out of life.

Risk management is there for a reason—namely to prevent future mishaps based on likelihood or

lessons learned from past accidents. This process saves lives and protects the force. Everyone must evaluate the controls we enforce in our training and everyday activities. You can’t have too many controls, but sometimes controls might be excessive.

For example, some units enforce the wear of the full safety reflective vest during



physical training (PT), while other units issue the yellow reflective belt to their Soldiers. Both items serve the same purpose, but the vest is more awkward than the lightweight, easily identifiable belt. Will Soldiers be seen more easily because the vest is larger? No—the belt works just as well.

In this instance, safety isn't just about being seen; it's also about the training and discipline each Soldier should receive and retain. Soldiers also should know where to conduct PT and places that have a high

traffic flow. They should slow down and look for oncoming traffic. They should run in open areas where they can be seen easily. A reflective vest or belt alone won't save Soldiers from being hit by a car. Leaders must ensure these principles are enforced during unit PT, not just issue a particular piece of equipment.

Soldiers receive much of their safety training through organized safety days that either fit inspection criteria or follow a major accident. The consensus usually is that

these events are a waste of time and the topics covered aren't relevant to real-world operations. Most Soldiers see safety days as checking the block even if the material is useful. The same can be said of weekend or holiday safety briefs. Leaders shouldn't rely solely on these sporadic events to spread the safety message. Soldiers should be trained and ready when they walk out the door to safely complete their mission or drive home.

Safety programs must reflect common sense and

Don't Look the Other Way

MSG JOHN KEEN

Accident Investigator

U.S. Army Combat Readiness Center

In today's fast-paced world, we've come to accept a lifestyle of "getting there fast." But at what cost? In the name of speed, whether it's behind the wheel or getting a job done, we sacrifice safety. You can measure the price of that sacrifice in Soldiers permanently removed from our ranks.

The statistics aren't just numbers—they're Soldiers' lives. Many of our young Soldiers are dying in automobile and motorcycle accidents because they lack good judgment; speed; and drive or ride under the influence of alcohol or while fatigued. Sadly, they die before surviving enough close calls to learn from them. In all too many cases, they believed they could drink and drive without any consequences.

I worked as a state trooper before coming to the Combat Readiness Center to work as an accident investigator. I performed hundreds of motor vehicle accident investigations on people who caused accidents or were victims of someone else's carelessness. Some of the worst experiences in my career were the many times I had to inform a family of a loved one's death. Their responses included guilt, anger, denial, and feeling responsible for the incident.

The response I didn't expect was, "We were wondering when this would happen." Yet that's what I heard from some people. They knew the victim well enough to know something terrible might happen but never did anything about it. They just looked the other way.

That's something to think about. How many times do we see someone

acting in a careless or reckless manner and say nothing? It's our responsibility as friends, Soldiers, and leaders to point out and correct these errors. As leaders, we must discipline wrong behavior and hold individuals accountable for their actions. However, we also have a duty to use our past experiences to help guide and train our Soldiers so we don't lose them prematurely. When we do nothing—when we look the other way and then make excuses when a Soldier is hurt or killed—we're just WRONG!

When we were younger we learned we weren't always the best judge of our abilities. We also learned that Murphy's Law—what can go wrong will—still applied. Today's young Soldiers are no different than we were. They also often overestimate their abilities and turn a blind eye toward danger.

As leaders, we've lived and learned. Now it's our turn to teach our Soldiers to learn and live. They're watching us because we set their goals and our expectations of them. When it comes to safety, if we don't care enough to correct them when they're wrong, they'll think it doesn't matter—that we've chosen to look the other way. But if the phone rings in the middle of the night and the unsafe Soldier we ignored is now in the morgue, we'll personally know the cost of a safety statistic. We won't be able to look the other way then.

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focus on the real reasons behind their use. These programs are optimized by meaningful, consistent training and the discipline instilled in all our Soldiers. How we implement safety procedures and train the force plays a huge role in helping Soldiers understand why we practice safety in the first place. Safety isn't just another thing our great Army tells us to do—it's the key to keeping our troops ready for the fight. 

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NEVER ENOUGH

Nowadays, units are being tasked to perform increasingly complex missions with fewer and fewer personnel. This shortfall is an obstacle, but one that can be overcome. The key is to develop junior subordinates and integrate Composite Risk Management (CRM) at all levels. The unit described here, however, let their personnel shortfall become a fatal obstacle.



H TO GO AROUND

G3, ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION DIVISION
Ground Branch
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Background


A company-sized unit made up of three platoons returned from Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2004 and had undergone a significant personnel change due to the loss of many NCOs. Additionally, several of the remaining NCOs were in various schools. Even with this lack of enlisted leadership,

the unit was conducting a training cycle to prepare for their return to Iraq in 2005.

The training was battalion-driven and included a field training exercise (FTX) scheduled to last several days. The FTX consisted of unit movement to the training area, followed by preparation and execution of “round robin” squad-level

training lanes. M113A3 Armored Personnel Carriers were to be used to transport troops from lane to lane. Leadership from the battalion down had conducted a walk-through of the training lanes and determined a steep slope at one lane’s entrance was a potential hazard.

Because of the shortage of NCOs, the command divided



one platoon into two squads instead of the usual three. The command also decided the platoon sergeant and platoon leader would run one of the lanes during the exercise. After these revisions, First Squad consisted of a specialist squad leader, three privates, and an additional two specialists and one private from the now-divided third squad. Second Squad consisted of one staff sergeant, one specialist, and five privates.

The squads were set up in this manner and finalized even though there were multiple NCOs in the other platoons' squads. Moreover, a commanding general's policy letter stated there must be an NCO in each vehicle at all times. The First Squad leader—the specialist—was new to the unit and had just transferred to active duty from the National Guard. He wasn't as proficient in his tasks as the other squad personnel.

The morning the company departed for the FTX, the platoon sergeant removed the specialist

as First Squad leader because of his proficiency shortcomings. He replaced the specialist with one of the squad's privates. This Soldier recently had been demoted from specialist to private first class for a past infraction. Nonetheless, he was highly regarded within the unit; the other Soldiers were surprised by the infraction.

The accident sequence

After the company arrived at the FTX area of operations, the personnel assigned to run the



The company commander allowed First Squad to participate in the FTX without direct NCO supervision. He also allowed the squad to operate the M113A3 without an NCO present.

lanes prepared for the next day's exercise. Each vehicle's personnel configuration consisted of the driver in the driver's hatch; the track commander (TC) in the commander's cupola; the squad leader standing behind the commander's cupola and propped through the cargo hatch; and the rest of the personnel in the troop compartment. Locally manufactured seat boxes were installed in the vehicles to

serve as both seats and storage compartments. Seatbelts were secured to the seat boxes, but none of the Soldiers wore them because they were unserviceable.

The next morning, the Soldiers of First Squad woke up, ate breakfast, and conducted their usual activities such as personal hygiene. They then loaded their vehicle in the configuration determined the day before.

En route to their training

lane, they got lost and went to a wrong lane after being told to go there by another squad leader. The lane officer in charge (OIC) gave them directions to the correct lane, and the driver and TC changed positions after a long while. The TC was more experienced at driving the M113A3 than the primary driver.

When First Squad finally reached the correct lane, the new squad leader—the

private—conducted troop leading procedures. He determined the squad didn't have weapons magazines for the lane training. They went to their platoon sergeant's location, secured the magazines, and went back to their training lane.

All the Soldiers dismounted to conduct the lane except the new squad leader, who was standing in the commander's cupola, and the original driver, who was driving the M113A3 again. The vehicle slowly trailed the squad as they conducted the lane. By the time First Squad completed the lane, they were behind schedule due to getting lost earlier. The command was anxious and pressing the squad to get to the next lane.

The squad loaded their vehicle in its previous configuration, with the first TC driving again and the former driver serving as the TC. The squad leader was still standing behind the commander's cupola and was propped through the cargo hatch. As the M113A3 sped to the next training lane, it began traveling faster than the tank trail's posted speed

limit. Their next lane was the first one they'd been to that morning for directions, and the driver was confident he could get there quickly. However, he hadn't been driving earlier in the day; he still was serving as TC at the time.


The driver sped up as he turned onto the road that led to the next lane. There he encountered the extreme downward slope noted earlier during the command walk-through. The tank trail intersected a hard asphalt road that ran perpendicular to the trail at the slope's base. The M113A3 accelerated down the steep grade, crossed the road, and went into an uncontrolled left slide. The vehicle then slid back onto the tank trail, impacted an embankment, and rolled 180 degrees before coming to rest on the cupola's armor plating and the hull's upper left edge.

The squad leader and one Soldier in the troop compartment were ejected and suffered fatal injuries as the vehicle slid to a stop. The five remaining Soldiers suffered moderate to minor injuries. The M113A3 suffered only minor damage.



Why the accident happened

- The driver didn't adjust his speed for existing road conditions when the vehicle descended the steep grade.
- The senior occupant allowed the vehicle's driver to approach and negotiate the steep grade without decelerating or selecting the appropriate transmission gear ratio.
- The company commander allowed First Squad to participate in the FTX without direct NCO supervision. He also allowed the squad to operate the M113A3 without an NCO present.
- The battalion commander recognized the steep grade as a hazard and alerted the lane



seatbelt use. This requirement also wasn't enforced in the unit.

- The vehicle seatbelts weren't attached to standard mounting hard points. Instead, they were bolted

Command personnel must conduct focused CRM training and emphasize their roles and responsibilities in the process. They also must ensure they understand appropriate risk acceptance levels. Command personnel also must include CRM in the planning process and give consideration to their subordinates' proficiency levels.

OIC. However, the battalion commander didn't ensure the hazard and appropriate controls were added to the battalion risk management worksheet.

- The platoon leader and platoon sergeant didn't adjust their planning and troop leading procedures to accommodate a squad wholly comprised of junior Soldiers with no direct NCO supervision. They specifically didn't ensure the squad leader knew or understood the day's missions, routes, or expected hazards.
- Rollover procedures weren't rehearsed or performed correctly during the rollover.
- The vehicle occupants failed to comply with published guidance directing mandatory

to unauthorized, locally manufactured seat boxes and were unserviceable.

- Neither the driver nor the TC was wearing approved eye protection. They were wearing their prescription glasses instead.

Countermeasures

- Ensure vehicle speeds remain within the technical operating procedures for road conditions.
- Senior occupants must be trained and understand their responsibilities.
- Command personnel must conduct focused CRM training and emphasize their roles and responsibilities in the process. They also must ensure they

understand appropriate risk acceptance levels. Command personnel also must include CRM in the planning process and give consideration to their subordinates' proficiency levels.

- A hazard tracking log is a good tool leaders can use to double-check and refine mission-specific risk management worksheets. Leaders must ensure risks are communicated down to the lowest level.

- Leaders must adjust or enhance troop leading procedures with regard to Soldier experience levels and personnel constraints.

- Vehicle crews must conduct hands-on rollover drills at regular intervals.

- Personnel must wear their seatbelts, and leaders must take appropriate command action to enforce their use.

- Leaders must ensure all vehicle modifications are included in the CRM process to help determine residual risk. Leaders then can take appropriate action in developing initial capabilities documents and a request for special mission modification in accordance with paragraph 3-8 of Army Regulation 750-10, *Army Modification Program*.

- Personnel must wear appropriate eye protection. 

Comments regarding this article may be directed to the U.S. Army Combat Readiness Center Help Desk at (334) 255-1390 or DSN 558-1390.

The physical fitness of today's Soldiers is essential to accomplishing the Army's missions. But what happens when a Soldier doesn't meet the standard?

Many Soldiers have died in recent months either during or shortly after physical training (PT). Special programs for at-risk Soldiers are outlined in Field Manual (FM) 21-20, *Physical Fitness Training*. In the incident described below, one such Soldier's leaders failed to heed advice from medical personnel and didn't follow the guidelines set forth in FM 21-20.

The Soldier was new to the unit and was deemed to be overweight and out of shape. Even so, the Soldier was scheduled to perform a 4-mile PT run (which included intermittent calisthenics) with the rest of his unit. The unit was in a combat theater and, due to the high temperature, the run was postponed until 2000 hours. However, the unit medic told both the team and squad leaders the Soldier shouldn't run because of recent medical issues.

The previous day, the Soldier was diagnosed as a possible heat casualty after he passed out in a guard shed. He required 3,000 cc of an intravenous electrolyte solution to treat his symptoms. Unfortunately, neither leader took this information into account. Against the medic's advice, they left the decision up to the Soldier. The squad leader even said, "He can run if he wants to!"

The Soldier decided to run and immediately fell behind the rest of the formation. Two team leaders were tasked to help him finish the exercise. After reaching the turnaround point, the remainder of the squad passed the three Soldiers on their way to the company area. The squad leader then directed the Soldier to return

to the formation as the pacesetter.

The formation slowed to a walking pace after reaching the cool-down point. At that time, the Soldier began staggering from side to side. The other Soldiers lowered him to the ground, and the unit medic began an assessment of the Soldier's condition.

The Soldier was moved to the forward support battalion's medical clinic, where he received two intravenous fluid lines and was immediately placed in ice. Shortly thereafter, medical personnel discovered the Soldier's body temperature was 106 °F. The Soldier was evacuated to a combat support hospital and later to another medical facility out of theater, where he received further intensive medical treatment. It was too little, too late, however. The Soldier's life support was terminated shortly after he arrived at the last medical facility.

A day-to-day unit PT program designed for most Soldiers might not be appropriate for all unit members. Some Soldiers simply can't exercise at the intensity or duration of their peers. Trained and knowledgeable leaders should develop and conduct special programs tailored to these Soldiers' needs. Pages 1 through 11 of FM 21-20 contain guidelines for developing



Out of

MSG MELVINE ALEXANDER
Accident Investigator
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f the Run

these type programs. The three groups of Soldiers that might need special consideration are:

- Those who fail the Army Physical Fitness Test but do not have medical profiles.
- Those who are overweight or over-fat according to Army Regulation 600-9, *The Army*

Weight Control Program.

- Those who have either permanent or temporary medical profiles.

In the end, it's up to leaders to ensure their Soldiers stay in the run. Nothing will ever replace a leader looking a Soldier in the eye and telling

him his individual strengths and weaknesses. Leaders lead, Soldiers follow, and leaders save lives! 🇺🇸

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The U.S. Army Combat Readiness Center (CRC) recently developed the Army Readiness Assessment Program (ARAP) to communicate the Army's strong conviction that Composite Risk Management (CRM) is the best way to defend against the significant losses currently being experienced in the force. Regardless of why or how a Soldier is lost, the result is the same—one less Soldier available for the fight. As accidents in our formations continue to degrade combat power, the CRC is committed to finding innovative ways to reduce accidents, decrease fatalities, and keep our Soldiers fit to continue

the Global War on Terror.

ARAP is a Web-based initiative that provides battalion-level commanders with data on their formation's readiness posture through five segments:

- Processes Auditing—assesses the processes used to identify hazards and correct problems
- Reward Systems—assesses the unit's program of rewards and discipline to reinforce proper behavior and correct risky actions
- Quality Control—places emphasis on high standards of performance
- Risk Management—assesses the health of unit processes
- Command and Control—assesses leadership,

communication, and policies as they relate to CRM

Designed for use by battalion-sized units, the program asks several questions of battalion commanders. Wouldn't you like to know if your unit is about to experience a mishap? Wouldn't you like to prevent the loss of personnel and equipment? Don't you want to protect your combat power?

One of ARAP's goals is to identify and correct organizational conditions that could increase the potential for mishaps. Following survey administration (the assessment phase), the commander receives one-on-one feedback on key issues regarding command climate, safety culture,

ARAP

Helping Leaders Save Lives

CHARLES SCHIEFFER

ARAP Program Manager
U.S. Army Combat Readiness Center

resource availability, workload, estimated success of certain safety intervention programs, and other factors relating to their unit's overall readiness.

Here's how it works. The battalion commander completes a personal telephone registration process with a member of the CRC ARAP team. From there the commander and unit personnel complete the online portion of the survey, which consists of 61 scaled questions that can be answered in about 12 minutes. Once the battalion has taken the survey, the battalion commander calls the CRC to receive an in-depth debrief of the results. This brief includes a discussion of the unit's strengths and weaknesses and also provides

suggestions for possible courses of action and solutions used by previous battalion commanders.

So, what's in it for me?

- All assessments are confidential. Only unit commanders or their designated representatives and the CRC have access to results. A confidential debrief is conducted on a one-on-one basis between the commander and the CRC.

- Assessments might be predictive. Studies conducted by the U.S. Navy over the past 6 years have shown that units in the survey's lower spectrum have twice the number of fatalities and more than twice the number of Class A accidents.

- All assessments and

users are anonymous.

- These assessments are a "free look" inside a unit. They allow commanders to take an honest look at their safety culture and evaluate CRM processes.

- The program is Web-based, quick, and easy:
<https://unitready.army.mil>.

For more information on ARAP or to schedule an assessment for your battalion, contact Mr. Charles Schieffer, ARAP Program Manager, at (334) 255-9362, DSN 558-9362, or by e-mail at charles.schieffer@us.army.mil or arap@crc.army.mil. The ARAP team looks forward to hearing from you!

Lost



Class A

- Soldier suffered fatal injuries when the M2A2 he was riding in rolled over into a canal. The vehicle was on an early morning patrol with its white lights on at the time of the accident. The Soldier was serving as the vehicle's track commander.



Class A (Damage)

- Four M1113 HMMWVs were destroyed when an electrical fire started in one of the vehicles and spread to the other three. The vehicles were parked in the motor pool. The accident occurred during the late evening.

Class A


- Soldier suffered fatal injuries when the M984 HEMTT he was riding in

overturned. The vehicle was part of a convoy when the driver experienced difficulty with the brakes, causing the rollover. The Soldier was serving as the vehicle's gunner. The driver also was injured. The accident occurred during the late evening.

Class B

- An M1113 HMMWV suffered Class B damage when it ran off the roadway and flipped end over end.

SEATBELT SUCCESS





Personnel Injury

Class A

■ Soldier collapsed and died following a field training exercise. The Soldier had just returned from the exercise and was entering the dining facility

Soldier also suffered fractures to his arm. The driver was not injured. The accident occurred during the late morning.

Class C

■ Soldier suffered back and neck injuries when the M1025 HMMWV he was riding

Soldier was killed when the M1114 HMMWV he was riding in overturned. The HMMWV was providing convoy security on an improved road when it rolled over. The Soldier was serving as the vehicle's gunner and was ejected during the rollover. Two other Soldiers also were ejected but were not injured. The accident occurred during the early morning.

in suddenly hit a washed out portion of the roadway. The Soldier was participating in a route reconnaissance mission as part of a training center field training exercise and was not wearing his seatbelt. The accident occurred during the early morning.

when he collapsed. He was pronounced dead at the local hospital. The accident occurred during the late afternoon.

■ Soldier suffered fatal injuries when a Light Medium Tactical Vehicle (LMTV) struck him during battalion physical

The vehicle was taking part in an OPTEMPO road test at the time of the accident. The driver was wearing his seatbelt and suffered minor injuries. The accident occurred during the late afternoon.

■ Soldier's finger was amputated when the M1114 HMMWV he was riding in rolled over. The HMMWV was on its way to a forward operating base when the driver reportedly failed to negotiate a turn and flipped the vehicle. The injured

CLASS STORIES Class C

Spotlighting Soldiers who wore their seatbelts and walked away from potentially catastrophic accidents

Class C

■ Two Soldiers suffered minor scratches when their M915A2 ran off the roadway and flipped over. The vehicle was towing a flatbed trailer loaded with two 20-foot conexes and was headed to a logistical support area at the time of the accident. The driver was conducting his second run of the day and had been on duty for 20 hours when he fell asleep at the wheel. The vehicle was traveling at an estimated 50 to 55 mph when the driver fell asleep

and lost control, causing the truck to roll over. Both Soldiers were wearing their seatbelts and helmets. The accident occurred during the mid-afternoon.

■ An M2A2 Bradley crew escaped injury when their vehicle rolled over. The vehicle was traveling under white lights along a narrow canal road when the driver felt the tracks slip. The vehicle shifted laterally to the right and began to roll after the driver stopped the vehicle.

The driver announced "rollover," and the crew took immediate action. The Soldiers were wearing their seatbelts and personal protective equipment and were returned to duty immediately. The accident occurred during the late evening.

■ Three Soldiers suffered minor injuries when their LMTV rolled over after striking a large crater in the roadway. The LMTV was going through a vehicle checkpoint when it

hit the crater and crashed into a barrier before overturning. The driver suffered fractures to his knee and was returned to duty after several days. The gunner suffered fractures to his wrist and was expected to return to duty within 2 weeks. The vehicle commander suffered minor cuts and abrasions and was released for duty immediately. All three Soldiers were wearing their seatbelts and helmets. The accident occurred during the early morning.



training (PT). The Soldier's company was pulling the LMTV when he reportedly fell. The LMTV rolled over the Soldier's chest and abdomen. The accident occurred during the early morning.

- Soldier collapsed and died while conducting personal PT. The Soldier was on TDY status away from home station and was pronounced dead at a local hospital. The accident occurred during the early morning.

- Soldier collapsed and died during a unit PT run. The Soldier was evacuated to a local hospital and pronounced dead a short time later. The accident occurred during the early morning.

- Soldier suffered fatal injuries when an unidentified round exploded. The Soldier was part of an advance party on a range and reportedly retrieved the round, which subsequently detonated. The accident occurred during the late morning.

- Cadet died after collapsing during a company PT run. The cadet was evacuated to a local hospital, where it was discovered his body temperature had risen to 105 degrees. He died a short time later. The accident occurred during the early morning.

- Soldier died while conducting a land navigation course. The Soldier was reported missing and later found unconscious. He was evacuated to a local hospital, where he subsequently died. Weather (heat) is a suspected factor. The accident occurred during the late afternoon.

- Soldier was electrocuted when he fell onto a railroad track. The Soldier was serving as the officer in charge of rail movement operations. Witnesses reported hearing an explosion and then seeing the Soldier fall onto the track. The Soldier died from his injuries more than 3 months after the accident, which occurred during the late morning.

Class C

- Two Soldiers suffered various minor injuries when they were struck by a HMMWV while running along a roadway. The Soldiers heard the HMMWV approach from behind and moved off the paved roadway onto the right shoulder. The HMMWV's driver became blinded by the sun, which impaired his vision and prevented him from seeing the two Soldiers. The accident occurred during the early morning.

WHAT THINK were they



Lost

King?


Hey guys... watch this!

People sometimes should heed the advice of those around them. So was the case with one young Soldier who thought it would be fun to discharge a fire extinguisher *without* a fire. The Soldier's wiser comrades repeatedly told him to stop playing around, but the wannabe firefighter scoffed at their advice. He pulled the pin and pushed the lever over and over until he finally got the result he *thought* he wanted. However, the extinguisher discharged right into the Soldier's hand, causing cuts and lacerations that landed him in quarters for 5 days. Sometimes life's lessons have to be learned the hard way.



What did you do that for?

Soldiers are told over and over to train as they'll fight. One Soldier conducting combative training took that guidance a little too far. The Soldier was instructing the class and was engaging another Soldier who was trying to gain the dominant position. The second Soldier's head got caught between the instructor's knees, and the instructor squeezed his knees together to trap his opponent. He realized he'd squeezed a little too hard, though, when the second Soldier said he heard something pop in his head. He was immediately taken to the local hospital, where a CT scan revealed a fracture to the bone under his left eye socket. The injury required surgery to correct. The instructor and his "knees of steel" were allowed to continue training with some restrictions.



STOP
WIN IN THE FIGHT

USE COMPOSITE RISK MANAGEMENT &
OWN THE EDGE.



U.S. ARMY COMBAT READINESS CENTER
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OWN THE
EDGE

Composite Risk Management

