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Guilty!!!

By: Risk Management Div
DSN: 956-8784

As the staff sergeant walked into the military court room to hear his fate, he had no idea what was about to happen to his military career. If he had only stopped and thought about what could go wrong, the sequence of events would definitely have been different.

The court was called to order. The staff sergeant and his defense counsel stood nervously awaiting the verdict. As he waited, his mind wandered back several months to the day he cleaned out his range bag from the field exercise his unit just completed. The little cache of simulators he had accumulated over the weeklong exercise would really make for a great July 4th celebration at the lake. The artillery simulators would definitely make for one loud boom and those green and red star clusters would look really impressive with the rest of the fireworks he bought downtown.

He stashed the simulators in the front hallway closet of his on-base apartment since it was only a few days until the holiday weekend trip to the lake to celebrate America’s birthday. Not realizing when he closed the door to the closet, the bag was jarred enough that one of the artillery simulators bounced out of the bag. Through opening and closing the door many times over the next few days, the pull cord on the simulator got tangled in the strings on a pair of shoes. As his wife later pulled the shoes out of the closet, the cord on the simulator was also pulled. The simulator began to whistle before it exploded and she realized something was not right. She did her best to back away from the door as the simulator exploded, knocking her down against the hallway wall.

The explosion sent her into shock and caught clothes in the closet on fire. Fortunately, the neighbors helped her and her four year old daughter out of the apartment and extinguished the flames before the fire department and the authorities arrived. Luckily, the other items did not ignite or detonate since that would have increased the size of the fire and endangered the entire building.

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As the Military Police, Explosives Ordnance Disposal Detachment Specialists and the Criminal Investigation Division Officers began to investigate the events, it was evident the young staff sergeant made several mistakes during the last training exercise he would ever participate in.


The judge's gavel brought him back to reality as the verdict was read. His fate was sealed as the military judge found him guilty on eight different charges and sentenced him to ten years at hard labor, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, reduction to the lowest military rank and dismissal from the US Army with a dishonorable discharge. His eleven year career was history, his family lost all their military benefits and their lives would never be the same again.

He just forgot to THINK!! He forgot to consider the consequences of what would happen if his wife or daughter was hurt or killed if the simulator cache accidentally exploded. If his daughter had opened the door and pulled those shoes out, she would not have realized what the whistling meant and could have possibly been seriously injured or killed. Those seemingly harmless simulators used in training are actually quite dangerous and can cause death. Unfortunately, we all go through those times when we think we can get away with things and this one literally could have cost this family everything.

ALWAYS remember, military munitions are not toys and should never be removed from the training areas or exercises. In the wrong hands, they can cause pain and suffering to the ones we love.

So, next time someone tells you they have the stars and boomers for the fireworks show, make sure they're talking about commercial fireworks you can legally buy at a fireworks stand and NOT military simulators and pyrotechnics.

This article is based on an actual court martial proceeding that occurred several years ago.



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66MM Rocket M72 (LAW) Accident

BY: Chemical/MEC Safety Div
DSN: 956-8155

A soldier was demonstrating “how to properly handle” the 66MM Rocket M72 (LAW) in his company headquarters shortly after 2100. He had opened the launcher, locked it into the open position when he pressed the trigger. The rocket fired; a soldier observing the process was fatally injured with a direct shot through the abdomen. The other three soldiers, in the room were injured. Following a number of safe operating practices could have prevented this accident from occurring. The guidelines apply to all weapons, both in training and in combat.

Safety begins with storage. When space is available, operational ammunition and explosives should be stored in separate facilities from training and inert/dummy ammunition. (DA PAM 385-64, paragraphs 3-5). Even when operational considerations make separate facilities impossible, training ammunition will be physically separated from operational ammunition (DA PAM 385-64, paragraphs 8-3 and 9-5).

“The rocket fired; a soldier observing the process was fatally injured.”

In addition, inert, empty and training ammunition must be positively identified as such. The guidelines for inert or empty ammunition are found in DA Pam 385-64 paragraph 3-5c. Among the guidelines is the requirement that it be stamped or stenciled with the marking “EMPTY” or “INERT.” According to FM 3-23.5, appendix B, field expedient trainers should meet the same requirement, except they shall be labeled as “TRAINER.” Additional requirements can be found in paragraph B-2.

Even if the operational ammunition is not separated or clearly identified from training, inert and empty rounds, accidents can be prevented by following basic weapons handling safety rules which are taught from the time a soldier first handles a weapon. Two of those guidelines have applicability in this situation: 1) Weapons should be handled as if they are loaded at all times, 2) Weapons are never pointed at an individual unless a life-threatening situation justifies the use of deadly force (TC 7-9 Infantry Live-Fire Training, paragraph A-4a(3)). Even if the soldier believed he was holding an inert round, it should not have been pointed in a direction he did not intend to fire. Assuming that a weapon is unloaded or inert is one of the leading causes of accidents with weapons.

When handling ammunition and explosives, even the smallest item can cause devastating injuries. By not following the safety procedures, the handler and those around them are either lucky or injured. Practicing safe handling both in training and in combat will help keep all participants alive and well.



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
 HEADQUARTERS, US FORCES-AFGHANISTAN
 NEW KABUL COMPOUND, KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
 APO AE 09356




USFOR-A-SAFETY

Fatality

02 February 2012

Ensure widest dissemination and post on bulletin boards

A service member was fatally wounded when another service member launched a Light Anti-Tank Weapon (LAW) in his direction at point-blank range. (Three more SMs were injured by the blast)



Important information to remember:

- **NEVER** point the muzzle of any AE toward another soldier – live or otherwise.
- Inert or dummy AE should **NOT** be stored in magazines with live AE when other storage space is available.
- Dummy/inert AE should be segregated from live AE and **clearly** identified.

“SAFETY IS INTEGRAL TO THE WARRIOR”

USFOR-A Safety Kabul
 DSN 318-449-4830

USFOR-A Ground Safety
 DSN 318-449-4829

USFOR-A Safety (S/SW)
 Kandahar
 DSN 318-421-7434

Task Force Patriot vs. Explosives Safety

As reported by: CW2 Keshia Stoudemire and SFC Walter Prater (RET)

During our deployment it was very difficult at times to get units to understand the importance of ammunition accountability and storage safety.

LESSONS LEARNED: TF Patriot's units fell in on ammunition that was transferred over by departing units. While conducting Battlefield Circulation throughout RC East Forward Operating Base (FOB) and Combat Outpost (COP) for TF Patriot's units, we found many units that had more ammunition than authorized. Units had not accurately conducted a 100% inventory of all ammunition on hand. Units were not organizing ammunition by DODICs, NSNs, Lot numbers or compatibility. Some units had ammunition that was affected by Notice of Ammunition Restrictions (NAR) and Ammunition Information Notices (AIN). NARs and AINs are used by the Joint Munitions Command (JMC) to alert the ammunition community to changes, usually negative, to individual lots of ammunition. No documentation was maintained of what was stored in each container. Some of our biggest concerns were with the number of mortars, 105MM and 155MM projectiles that had some areas well over their Net Explosives Total (NET). Ammunition managers were not being used correctly to help with the accountability of their unit ammunition accounts.

PROBLEMATIC SCENARIOS:

During our inspections, we found some containers packed full, with little to no room to walk in them, subsequently there was no way to tell what was being stored in them. The size of some FOBs or COPS and the amount of ammunition being stored made it hard to stay under the NET. This also caused compatibility issues for some units that did not have enough containers or space to properly segregate and store their ammunition. Some units were still firing ammunition that had been downgraded by NARs or AINs. Some of the ammunition managers did not have access (SIPR account) to know exactly what their units had on hand for ammunition. Ammunition was not stored on a minimum of 3 inches of dunnage material from the ground. Units that had white phosphorus (WP) rounds did not have them stored correctly.

“Some units were still firing ammunition that had been downgraded by NARs or AINs.”

RECOMMENDATIONS: We directed units to conduct: 100% inventories and report numbers of all ammunition they had on hand. Identify, separate, tag and/or turn-in ammunition affected by the NARs and AINs. Use ammunition managers help with identifying what ammunition was affected by NARs and AINs. When conducting our inspections of ammunition storage we used a checklist to show and explain to units what we were looking for. To assist in reducing their NET, units were instructed to turn in any ammunition that they were not going to use or authorized to have. Units were also instructed to use pallets, or some other material, to keep ammunition off the ground and on the proper storage of WP rounds.

Claymore Mine Accident Blamed on HERO

BY: Chemical/MEC Safety Div
DSN: 956-8155

Recently, a malfunction occurred in the field involving an accidental detonation of an M4 electric blasting cap assembly that accompanies the M18A1 Claymore mine, DODIC K143. Investigation of this two-injury accident, which were not serious or life threatening, concluded that an opened combination dust cover/shorting plug on the M4 blasting cap assembly's connector contributed to the cause of the accident. **The M4 blasting cap is susceptible to HERO** (Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance) after dust cover/shorting plug removal.

The following steps will ensure safe handling:

1. Conduct a continuity test of the firing circuit before placing blasting cap into the detonator well of mine.
2. Do not connect the M57 firing device to the firing wire until the actual time of firing.
3. Keep dust cover/shorting plug closed until the blasting cap has been inserted into the mine.
4. Keep blasting cap inside the spool of the M4 blasting cap assembly until ready to unwind and arm. This prevented the injuries from the accident mentioned above from being serious.
5. Turn off all radios and other radiofrequency (RF) emitting devices when using the M4 blasting cap assembly. Ensure any RF emitting equipment is located at a safe distance away per guidance in DA Pam 385-64, paragraph 17-15. Cellular phones should not be present within ten feet of any unpackaged, electrically-primed ammunition, such as the M4 blasting cap.



Electrically initiated Claymore mines are safe and will continue to be used, but future mine purchases will only contain non-electric initiators, which are not HERO sensitive.

Source: Ammunition Information Notice AIN 049-12 - <https://apps.jmc.army.mil/ains/Files/AIN49-12.txt>

Defense Ammunition Center Training

<http://ammo.okstate.edu/>

Ammunition Community of Practice

Have you joined the Ammunition Community of Practice (Ammo CoP) yet? Do you know what it is? Who uses Ammo CoP?

The Ammo CoP resides on the Acquisition Community of Connection (ACC) and its purpose is to share knowledge throughout the ammunition enterprise. The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) partnered with the Defense Ammunition Center (DAC) to assist with building and hosting Ammo CoP. The CoP was deployed in November of 2008 and now has more than 4,800 members. In 2009 the Ammunition Community of Practice won the Army Knowledge Management Award.

Who uses Ammo CoP? The CoP is for anyone who works with and/or around ammunition. The CoP supports ammo professionals, soldiers and civilians. The public has access to some of the CoP without the requirement of membership. The topics, Members' names/profiles, Q and A, and the CoP Newsletter, are protected and can only be viewed by Ammo CoP members after they login.



Why should you use the Ammo CoP? The CoP is available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. You can access the latest information on Safety, Operations, Logistics, Publications and Points of Contact. The Ammo CoP has web links to subjects such as the [Munitions History Program \(MHP\)](#) and the [Ammunition Multimedia Encyclopedia](#). The CoP also has links to training sites and two new ammo training apps, [Ammo Storage Compatibility Game \(SCG\)](#) and [Explosive Safety Quantity Distance \(ESQD\)](#) Mobile app. The Ammo CoP Newsletter was used to introduce the Apps to the ammo community.

Why should you join the Ammo CoP? The members of the Ammo CoP could benefit from your experience and knowledge. Also they are willing to assist you in finding the answers to your questions and any information you may need. To join the Ammo CoP go to <https://acc.dau.mil/ammo> and click on the “Become a Member” link, and complete the questionnaire. Within a couple of days your membership will be approved and you will receive a Welcome Letter with information to assist you in getting the most out of the site.

Now that you are a member, remember, this CoP is for collaboration and knowledge sharing among all within the ammunition community. If you have a question that we may be able to help you answer, or if you have developed an SOP, best practice, or Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) that helps you do your job, post it to Ammo CoP. The few minutes you take to upload something could save someone else hours of work.


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Interim Hazard Classification (IHC) on the Web! (Finally!)


BY: Chemical/MEC Safety Div
DSN: 956-8155

If you ship non-standard ammunition you know how much fun it can be to find a current IHC for the item(s) you're shipping. Now you can find them, at least those issued by the US Army Technical Center for Explosives Safety (USATCES), on the web!

You'll need to go here: <https://dac.jmc.army.mil/IHCS/Ihcs/IhcsList.aspx>, log in with your CAC, and register as a 'Viewer'. Once registered, you'll be able to see a list of current and expired IHCs. There is a search function to help you find the particular IHC you're interested in. Please note the **i** to the left of search box, clicking on it will give you information on the various wild cards available to narrow your search. Also, please note the various click boxes to the right of the search box, unclicking/clicking these can further narrow your search argument.



Depending on the originating organization, when you click on the link to certain IHCs you may get a pop-up with a button to generate an email requesting a copy of the IHC.



If you're still unable to find the IHC you need, or if you need any other assistance, you can still contact the US Army Technical Center for Explosives Safety (USATCES) Hazard Classifiers at usarmy.mcalester.usamc.list.dac-hc@mail.mil for assistance.

The latest version of the Department of the Army Pamphlet 385-64, Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards is available at:

http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/pdf/P385_64.PDF

UNITED STATES ARMY TECHNICAL CENTER FOR EXPLOSIVES SAFETY (USATCES)

BY: Chemical/MEC Safety Div
DSN: 956-8155

Mission: To preserve Warfighting capabilities and enhance the Force by providing a safe and healthy environment for Soldiers, civilians, families, and contractors through execution, and management of the US Army Explosives and Chemical Agent Safety Programs.

The genesis of USATCES was as a result of recommendations by a General Officer Steering Committee (1985-1987) that studied a total of 30 ammunition-related accidents up to that time. The formal recommendations of that committee included the establishment of an Executive Director of Explosives Safety (EDES), the current Army Materiel Command (AMC) Deputy Commander; the Department of the Army Explosives Safety Council (DAESC); and the formation of USATCES. USATCES was established as an element of the Defense Ammunition Center in 1988 by AMC Permanent Order 60-1. Prior to this date the Army did not have any organization that had explosives safety program management in its charter.

Since “Army” explosives safety is the foundation of USATCES’ charter, USATCES is under the operational control of the Director of Army Safety (DASAF) and staff. USATCES exists as the Army’s explosives safety center of expertise answering the call of not only the DASAF, but also being the communication link between the highest levels of explosives safety, the Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB); the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health (DASA(ESOH)); the EDES, and to the world-wide Army munitions community. Technical support and execution of the DASAF’s explosives safety management program is conveyed on his behalf to all Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, Direct Reporting Units, Field Operating Agencies, and Chief, National Guard Bureau. To accomplish this critical mission, USATCES is staffed with a diverse group of safety and munitions professionals from Army Career Programs 12, 20, and 33. These include Safety Engineers, Safety & Occupational Health Specialists, Quality Assurance Specialist (Ammunition Surveillance) (QASAS), and Logistics Management Specialists. Additionally, the organization is supplemented with Technical Information/Database Managers and Administrative personnel to provide quality information management and distribution.

The deep-rooted tenet to which USATCES must constantly consider, evaluate, and advise is referred to as the “Cardinal Principle of Explosives Safety”. Simply stated, the principle is, “Expose the minimum amount of personnel, to the minimum amount of explosives, for the minimum amount of time.” Inherently, all activity with regard to ammunition and explosives (A&E) has some level of risk. To educate and reinforce the “Principle” concept, USATCES has established, by regulation or event, the following functions: Explosives and Chemical Agent Safety Site Plans; Hazard Classification for A&E; Technical Assistance/Guidance for A&E considerations; Explosives Accident/Mishap Investigation Support; Explosives Safety Assistance Visits; Explosives Safety Risk Assessments; and Explosives Safety Policy and Regulatory Development.

With being physically located at the Defense Ammunition Center (DAC), McAlester Oklahoma, coordination is possible with expertise existing in all of the DAC directorates (Training, Engineering, Technology, and Operations). This synergy between the DAC and USATCES facilitates a highly informed approach to solving critical explosives safety situations or ensuring the application of explosives safety tenets to world-wide ammunition lifecycle issues. Since 2002, the DAC, with USATCES as its Explosives Safety Directorate,

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has been ISO 9001:2008 (E) certified, with the highest priority being customer support. As a tenant of the McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, USATCES also plays an active role in maintaining its ISO 14001 registration.

Education is the most important step for establishing and maintaining a well-founded and effective explosives safety management program. USATCES actively works with military and commercial training professionals to present the highest quality information as required by today's A&E community. Key USATCES personnel currently participate on both Department of Defense (DOD) and Army-level training and education working groups that are actively identifying and instituting explosives safety certification requirements for Army A&E professionals.

Since 2008, USATCES has provided an in-theater presence in both Iraq and Afghanistan, not only to provide technical assistance and explosives safety training, but also to identify the need for updates to both DOD and Army doctrine with regard to A&E safety. Additionally, teams have been requested and provided to both the theater and other OCONUS locations to not only solve some specific concerns but also provide an "on-the-job" training experience for the explosives safety core of the organizations being assisted.

The most significant future challenge for the USATCES is the continuing evolvement of military installations, activities, doctrine, and operations into a "Joint" environment. On any given day, the Army either has the lead or subservient role in a scenario. To eliminate the need for internal conflict resolution with the other Military Services, USATCES is communicating with the respective explosives safety elements of the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. What allows USATCES to see the "light at the end of this tunnel" is that all the organizations live by the same "Cardinal Principle".

Dr. Upton Shimp, Ph.ED, is the new Director of USATCES and the DAC.

The latest version of AR 385-10, The Army safety Program, is available at the following link:

http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/pdf/R385_10.PDF

“Ma Deus” (M2A1 Machine Gun Upgrade)

BY: Chemical/MEC Safety Div
DSN: 956-8155

“Weapon may explode if not properly headspaced!” an M2 instructional poster warns. Headspace is the distance between the face of the bolt and the bottom of the cartridge case in the chamber, and timing is the adjustment of the gun so that firing takes place when recoiling parts are in the correct position. Setting them involves screwing in the barrel, listening for clicks and making adjustments with a small tool. It’s a tedious process and can take up to 20 minutes. Introduction of the M2A1 model should change all that.

The .50-caliber M2 machine gun was developed by John Browning in 1918 at the end of World War I. The belt-fed machine gun became standard-issue in the U.S. Army in 1933. 1LT Audie Murphy, among the most decorated American soldiers in World War II, used one atop a burning tank destroyer in France to fend off a German infantry attack on Jan. 26, 1945, for which he was awarded the Medal of Honor.

Soldiers using the older model M2 machine gun must change the barrel when it overheats. They wear heat-resistant gloves when handling the barrel, which can glow neon orange during heavy fire. Soldiers can be hurt if they don’t properly reset the weapon, as is required on these older weapons, before firing. Since December 2007, at least 143 malfunctions occurred, including 124 in Iraq and 19 in Afghanistan, and, from 2009 to 2011, at least 39 Soldiers were injured due to improper headspace and timing. Malfunctions can lead to equipment failures such as rounds firing when they’re not supposed to or cracked barrel extensions. These malfunctions are not caused by gun flaws. They are caused by soldiers not following the procedures in the technical manual.

The Army has purchased 6,400 quick-change barrel kits that let soldiers change barrels without manually resetting the weapon. The Army plans to upgrade its entire M2 inventory of 45,000 guns to newer M2A1 models through the addition of these kits. The M2A1 weapon will operate more like the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon, or “SAW,” and the M240 Medium Machine Gun.



1LT Murphy recreates his MoH action in the movie, “To Hell and Back”.



WHY DO I NEED A SITE PLAN/SAFETY SUBMISSION?

By: Risk Management Div
DSN: 956-8784

A site plan/safety submission is a basic composite risk management (CRM) tool to ensure the minimum risk to personnel, equipment, and assets, while meeting the required mission requirements. Liability for accidents involving ammunition and explosives (AE) or military toxic chemical agents (CA) is like any other commodity we deal with and that liability cannot be negated. Because the AE/CA has properties that can release large amounts of energy, or has an inherent danger associated with it, there are risk associated with handling and storage of AE/CA that is not found with other commodities. The military chain of command decides who is responsible for this liability should an accident occur. The lowest responsibility of accepting liability is with the individual, the highest level of acceptance rests with our Commander-In-Chief.

At the lowest level we have Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) and manuals that direct how we will handle these items based on past history, accident rates, and testing. At the highest level the Commander-In-Chief has delegated authority of AE/CA to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense is responsible for developing safe procedures for AE/CA. The Secretary of Defense has delegated part of this authority down to each Service to develop their own requirements for AE based on service mission requirements. Each Service has developed handling and storage criteria of AE based on these requirements and the item being handled. The Army, because they are the only Service with CA, has the responsibility to develop safe practices for CA to include Recovered Chemical Warfare Material (RCWM). These handling and storage criteria are based on testing and past history of the individual item. The Service then pushes down to the commanders part of the responsibility for safe handling and storage of AE/CA. Each commander can take these Service requirements and, based on mission requirements, develop another set of rules for each operation. This is where we arrive at the lowest level of acceptance. The worker can accept these restrictions and risk which are stated in local regulations and/or SOPs or refuse to do the job. All of this is based on risk acceptance.

The Secretary of Defense has published the level of risk acceptance authorized by the Department of Defense (DOD) for AE/CA operations. This level is public knowledge and for AE/CA is found in the DOD 6055.09-M, DOD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards. The Services have published the maximum level of risk each is willing to accept from AE/CA items. They are found in the respective safety manuals of each Service. Each commander may be more restrictive and publish local regulation that state the amount of risk that commander is willing to accept.

I know the question is what does this information have to do with a site plan? It is the level of risk each level of command is willing to accept in case of an accident or inadvertent detonation of an AE item or an accident with CA. At the lowest level the individual has to accept the risk. This is why the individual signs they have read and understood the SOP. They are accepting the responsibility for their action if they do not follow the prescribed procedure. Each individual is responsible to read and understand local regulations and follow them. By virtue of implied consent, the individual by coming to work is saying they will follow the regulation and if they deviate from this and cause an accident they accept that risk. The same applies all the way up the chain of command. If a local commander does not have a site plan, that commander is saying that they accept the responsibility and if that operation does not meet the Service standard that commander is still responsible. If that commander has a site plan/safety submission that meets the Service standard, and that submission is

...continued from page 12

approved by that Service then that service is the responsible party. If that Service meets DOD standards and has a site plan/safety submission approved by the Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB) then DOD has accepted the responsibility for that location. Of course all this is as long as the location continues to meet and follow the approved standards.

To summarize a site plan/safety submission is a risk acceptance tool. The DOD and each Service has published the level of risk they are willing to accept from AE/CA storage and operations. Liability from an AE/CA accident cannot be declared officially invalid or ineffective, but if the lower level meets the higher commands level of risk it allows that higher command to accept that liability and the responsibility. This acceptance is done from the lowest worker level by reading and signing the proper SOP. The commander at a post/camp/station/installation acknowledges acceptance and pushes that liability up the command chain by doing a site plan/safety submission and forwarding it through command to their respective Service. The Service then verifies that the site plan/safety submission does meet that Service's published level of risk and sends the site plan/safety submission to DDESB. DDESB reviews the site plan/safety submission and verifies that it meets DOD Standards and if it does, accepts the responsibility for the Department of Defense. This approval shifts the liability up the chain of command, it does not eliminate it. The liability is only accepted by the higher command as long as the lower command or individual follows the Service or DOD regulations. This is what the site plan/safety submission does, it is a written document that affirms that lower command level will follow the regulations and allows that higher command to accept the responsibility in case of an accident or inadvertent detonation of AE/CA.

By: Risk Management Div
DSN: 956-8784

Ammunition FAQ

Question: What are ways of eliminating or mitigating any glass hazard found within the IBD arc of potential explosive sites?

Answer:

- (1) Replacement of standard glass windows, if possible, with blast resistant glass.
- (2) The application of fragment retention films on window interiors
- (3) Covering the inside of windows with 1/2 inch plywood and strengthening window frames.
- (4) Installation of heavy curtains, blast curtains, or other similar shields to catch or impede glass shards (application of fragment retention film, minimum thickness of 4 mil - technically known as daylight application - used in conjunction with these curtains has been found to significantly increase the curtain's hazard-reducing effectiveness).

DA Pam 385-64 paragraph 16-13c (1) (2) (3) (4)

Question: What documents need to be submitted for a site plan when using the new ESS software?

Answer:

The site plan requirements provided in DA Pam 385-65 apply to all site plans regardless how generated. The difference with those generated with ESS software is that the quantity distance computation worksheet and map for each potential explosion site is generated from the ESS software. This documentation is submitted as a PDF with any other documents required for site plans per the DA Pam 385-65, Explosives and Chemical Site Plan Development and Submission. (http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/pdf/p385_65.pdf)

HERO

HAZARDS OF ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION TO ORDNANCE

The most efficient and, subsequently, easiest method of managing the conflict between Electromagnetic Environment (EME) and HERO Classified Ordnance is compromise.



By: Risk Management Div
DSN: 956-8784

With more powerful antenna systems and wireless communications systems coming online, coupled with inter-service overlap on military installations, ordnance handlers must remain vigilant to the hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation (EMR) to electrically initiated devices (EIDs) in ordnance. Common electrically-initiated ordnance includes electrically-primed cartridges, electrically-fired rockets, and items containing electrically-initiated detonators. A non-conductive weapon skin or portions of a weapon skin that are non-conductive can act as an entry point and the electrical leads on the exterior can act as an antenna to the EMR. The circuits in the weapon cannot distinguish between an accidentally-induced signal and a purposeful one. An accidentally-induced signal can cause the degradation of sensitive electrical components leading to a weapon malfunction in a time of need or, in a worse case, functioning of EIDs at an inappropriate time that poses a risk to personnel, aircraft, ships, vehicles, and mission performance. One way to determine safe separation distance between ordnance and radio frequencies (RF) sources is to follow Table 17-3, entitled “Minimum Safe Distance from Transmitter Antennas” in the DA PAM 385-64. Table 17-3 is divided into three columns: transmitter power, distance in meters, and distance in feet. Some common control measures are: 1) turn off all RF emitters while uploading unpackaged ammunition, 2) shield uploaded unpackaged ammunition from RF emissions that could pose safety or reliability issues to prevent accidental initiation or degradation of the ordnance, and 3) monitor the proximity of RF sources to ammunition storage areas to ensure that adequate safe separation distances are maintained from all possible transmitter sources.



DOD 6055.09-M, “DOD Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards”, contains several paragraphs that address hazards of EMR to ordnance, starting at Vol 2, para E3.7. It is highly recommended for all ammunition personnel to be aware of and review the current standards on HERO.

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Low power transceiver devices, such as cellular telephones, active pagers, and some 2-way radios, automatically transmit RF energy without operator action, even when not in use. Prior to using any electronic device in ordnance areas be certain to review DA 385-64 paragraph 17-15, Hazards of electromagnetic radiation to electroexplosive devices. This paragraph lists the minimum separation distances and guidance pertaining to transmitting devices.



Other sources of HERO information can be found at the following links.

<https://www.e3teamonline.org>

<http://acc.dau.mil/joerad>

Both of the above web sites require a CAC for access to the site. Once at the site, you can request password access. HERO is everyone's business.

Warning Labels may be affixed on operated portable emitters to warn operators of the potential hazards.

Improving Explosives Safety Competency

By: Risk Management Div
DSN: 956-8784

An Army Working Group has been evaluating and assessing the gaps identified by Army safety careerists and others in the area of explosives safety. One of the first initiatives of this WG was to improve the Introductory course AMMO-107. Now that this has been completed, the Director of Army Safety has established policy in the Memorandum shown which was signed 1 February 2012. In this policy, all CP-12 careerists are required to take the prerequisite courses and AMMO-107 by 31 December 2013. All courses are available as distance learning at: <http://ammo.okstate.edu/>

BG Wolf states "Our CP-12 safety professionals are the best in the world, and on-going training is essential to keep up with changes in policy, standards, and technology and to share lessons learned."

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Text taken from Memorandum dtd. 1 February 2012 signed by BG Wolf, Director of Army Safety.

Subject: Career Program 12 (CP12) Core Competency Explosives Safety Training Requirements

1. Recognizing the high risks associated with ammunition and explosives and the need to continually enhance the competencies of our safety professionals, the Army Safety Coordinating Panel directed the improvement of explosives safety training, awareness, and resources. The Explosives Safety Training Working Group (ESTWG) was established to lead this effort. The ESTWG has updated explosives safety training requirements and revised and added coursework to enable safety professionals to meet these requirements.

2. The following training requirements are effective immediately to enhance the knowledge and skills of Army safety professionals:

a. Explosives safety is a core competency of CP12 safety and occupational health professionals. CP12 careerists in job series 0018, 0019, 0081, 0640, 0690, 0803, 1306, 1815, and 1825 will complete introductory-level training in explosives safety and explosives safety management.

b. Defense Ammunition Center (DAC) course AMMO-107 is the only approved introductory-level training in explosives safety and explosives safety management. CP12 careerists in job series 0018, 0019, 0081, 0640, 0690, 0803, 1306, 1815, and 1825 will complete AMMO-107 and prerequisites at their earliest convenience but no later than 31 Dec 13. AMMO-107 is available as distance learning (http://ammo.okstate.deu/content/news/Ammo_107_announcement.pdf) or resident training. Please contact the US Army Combat Readiness/Safety Center (USACR/SC) for information on resident training. CP12 interns are required to complete DAC AMMO-107 resident training.

c. There are three prerequisite DAC courses for AMMO-107: AMMO-45, Introduction to Ammunition; AMMO-63, U.S. Army Explosives Safety Familiarization; and AMMO-78, Ammunition Publications. All prerequisite courses are available as distance learning at <http://ammo.okstate.edu/>.

3. Army Headquarters CP12 career program managers will ensure safety professionals in their commands are aware of and comply with these requirements. In addition, compliance will be assessed during the Office of the Director of Army Safety (ODASAF) audits of Army Headquarters safety programs and during Headquarters Department of the Army explosives safety reviews at the installation/activity level.

4. Our CP12 safety professionals are the best in the world, and on-going training is essential to keep up with changes in policy, standards, and technology and to share lessons learned. By completing the above listed training, our safety professionals will be more competent and effective in all areas of explosives safety.

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
Additional explosives safety training requirements for CP12 personnel with roles/responsibilities in explosives safety will be announced in the coming months.

5. I thank you for your support with this very important initiative. My points of contact are Mr. Jim Patton in the Office of the Director of Army Safety (james.t.patton10.civ@mail.mil), 703-697-1306), Ms. Sally Riggins, the USACR/SC-DAC liaison (sally.a.riggins.civ@mail.mil, 334-255-9863), and Dr. Brenda Miller, the CP12 Functional Chief's Representative (brenda.g.miller.civ@mail.mil, 334-225-2959).

//Signed//

WILLIAM T. WOLF
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Director of Army Safety

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New UXO posters available from the Joint Munitions Command (JMC). Contact Ms. Pamela Proper (pamela.j.proper.civ@mail.mil) for ordering instructions.

Let's Talk Reduced QD Magazines

By: Risk Management Div
DSN: 956-8784

You are all probably aware that there are certain earth-covered magazines (ECMs), aboveground storage magazines (AGMs), and containers listed in Table AP1-4 of Technical Paper 15 (TP15) that have been approved by the DDESB with reduced net explosives weights (NEWs) or reduced quantity-distances (QDs). These magazines include the GOLAN 5, 10, and 15, NABCO SV-23 and SV-50, Canine Training Aid Explosives Storage Magazine (CETASM), and Advanced Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Magazine.

This table summarizes the NEW and QD requirements for a few of the reduced quantity magazines. The information comes from either Table AP1-4 of the TP15 or from the DDESB approval memorandum for that magazine.

Organizations use these reduced QD magazines to help provide AE storage in areas where it might be difficult to provide the required QD to exposures under normal circumstances. In planning the location for a reduced QD magazine, there is an additional distance requirement that often gets overlooked. There is a minimum distance requirement for orienting the magazine door away from occupied spaces and facilities. For a reduced QD magazine authorized to contain up to 30 lbs of HD 1.1, a minimum 50 feet separation distance is to be maintained from the door of the magazine, and from any authorized AE operation at the magazine, to the nearest occupied space or facility. For a reduced QD magazine authorized to contain 30 to 50 lbs the minimum distance is 100 feet.

	MAG MCE (lbs HD 1.1)	IBD (ft)	PTRD (ft)	ILD (ft)
GOLAN 5	11	30	20	10
GOLAN 10	23	3	3	3
GOLAN 15	33	4	4	4
NABCO SV-23	32	15	15	5
NABCO SV-50	50	F/S - 20		
R - 5	F/S - 20			
R - 5	F/S - 20			
R - 5				
CETASM	1.25	25	15	12
Advanced EOD	1.25	10	10	10

Notes:
F/S is Front/Side; R is Rear.
For the CETASM and Advanced EOD magazines, refer to TP15 for information in meeting the 1.25 pound MCE requirements.



Advanced EOD Magazine

So, if you're planning on taking advantage of a reduced QD magazine for storage needs, don't forget to allow for enough room between exposures and the door of the magazine in addition to the IBD, PTRD, and ILD exposure requirements.

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Accident Shorts

Service Member was executing a left side pivot drill. The muzzle of his weapon was in the down position. During the pivot, the service member inadvertently moved his weapon from safe to the fire position and his finger was on the trigger guard. Pressure was applied to the trigger, with the resulting negligent discharge, of a 5.56 mm ball round. The service member shot himself in the left foot.

Service member drew his 9mm weapon from his holster with his right hand. He attempted to transfer the weapon to his left hand. He applied pressure to the trigger, causing the weapon to fire a round through his thigh.

During weapons qualification, there was a double feed, of 7.62mm ball. The service member removed the barrel without allowing the weapon to cool. A round partially lodged in the chamber cooked off. A piece of the cartridge case struck the service member on the chin.

The service member unrolled a roll of electric wire, for use with the M18A1 AP mine (Claymore). He did not realize the blasting cap was attached to the wire. The blasting cap exploded causing injury to the service member's right foot.

Service member was returning through the entry control point (ECP) with his platoon from a patrol in Tikrit, Iraq. All personnel, except the service member, were clearing their weapons at the clearing barrel. He was attempting to clear/dismount the M2 machine gun, on the MRAP, when the gun discharged. The weapon thrust into the service member's chest; the round exploded. Part of the right side of the service member's face was sheared off, resulting in his death.

DoD civilian was using a flash/bang grenade for training new personnel at the Ammunition Supply Point (ASP). The grenade had been turned in as amnesty; he believed it was expended. The grenade functioned in his hand, resulting in a ruptured eardrum and severe lacerations requiring 20-30 stitches.

The EXPLOSIVE SAFETY BULLETIN (ESB) targets the ammunition/explosives community. Contents are not necessarily the views of or endorsed by the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or any other US Government agency. The editorial content of the ESB is the responsibility of the US Army Technical Center for Explosives Safety (USATCES), McAlester, OK. Contributions are welcome. Contact information: E-mail address: usarmy.mcalester.usamc.list.dac-bulletin@mail.mil. Postal address: Explosives Safety Bulletin, ATTN: JMAC-ESM, 1 C Tree Road, Bldg 35, McAlester, OK, 74501-9053. Phone: (918) 420-8745, DSN 956-8745. Fax: (918) 420-8503, DSN 956-8503

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Mr. Ken Williams
Deputy Director, USATCES

Mr. Terry Trivitt
Chief, Explosives Safety Knowledge,
MEC, & Chemical Division

Ms. Kimberly Cambron
Chief, Risk Management Division

Mr. Mark Featherston
Bulletin Coordinator



Explosives Safety Points of Contact

By: Risk Management Div
DSN: 956-8784

The following are the office addresses and telephone numbers to notify when inter-service explosives safety issues arise:

ARMY: The Army has identified three locations. All are acceptable for notification and proper coordination will follow a request.

- Office of the Director of Army Safety, 9351 Hall Road, Building 1456, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5860. Email: usarmy.pentagon.hqda-aso.mbx.army-safety-office@mail.mil. Phone: DSN 227-1306/1322/1128, commercial (703)697-1306/1322/1128.
- Director, U.S. Army Technical Center for Explosives Safety, ATTN: JMAC/ES, 1 C Tree Road, McAlester, OK 74501-9053, DSN 956-8756, commercial (918) 420-8756.
- Got an ammo question? Use AmmoHelp: <https://dac.jmc.army.mil/AmmoHelp/OpenAccess/AskQuestion.aspx>

NAVY:

- Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity (NOSSA), ATTN: N5, 3817 Strauss Avenue, Ste 108, Indian Head MD 20640-5151; DSN - 354-6031; Commercial (301) 744-6031; E-mail - inhdnossa-esipm@navy.mil.

AIR FORCE:

- Headquarters, Air Force Safety Center (AFSEC), ATTN: SEW, 9700 G Avenue, SE, Kirtland AFB, NM 87117-5670, DSN: 246-6059, Commercial: (505) 846-6059.

MARINE CORPS:

- Marine Corps Systems Command (MSCS), ATTN: PMAMMO, 2200 Lester Street, Quantico Virginia 22134, DSN 378-8780, commercial (703) 432-8780